Quasar by Nuzzo Dev Studio - Product Guide › Deployment, tenancy and security
The git host
- Quasar reads, never writes. On Bitbucket and GitHub its only write to a repository is the webhook subscription that tells it about new commits (on GitHub, also about finished workflow runs), and a test holds that list to one. On GitLab it writes nothing (since 2026.11.14): a person creates the webhook by hand.
- On GitHub, only a fine-grained token (since 2026.11.11). A classic token is refused when it is saved, since it reaches every repository of its account; a fine-grained one can be limited to the repository and to the permissions Quasar needs, all read-only but Webhooks. Where a permission is missing, Quasar names it from GitHub's own answer.
- On GitLab, a personal access token with
read_api only (since 2026.11.14). That one scope is enough for every read Quasar makes, and since Quasar creates no webhook there, nothing that writes is asked for. Where a scope is missing, Quasar names the ones GitLab says it accepts. Since 2026.11.16 the token's scopes, as GitLab names them when the token is saved, are kept beside its expiry, so the repository's page says whether read_api is there before a read fails. The webhook made by hand is read back, never written, when a person presses Check.
- Every repository credential is stored encrypted and never shown again.
- The token's expiry is a deadline the system keeps (since 2026.11.12). The day a repository's token stops working is read from the host's own answers on GitHub and, since 2026.11.14, on GitLab, or stated by whoever saves or rotates a Bitbucket token, since Bitbucket says it in no answer. It becomes a deadline of the project, with reminders, written only by Quasar: no person or key edits, deletes or settles it, and a new token never inherits the old one's day. The day is not secret; the token stays encrypted and is never shown again.
- A delivery proves where it comes from. Every webhook delivery is checked before it is read, and one that does not prove it was made with the repository's secret is refused. On GitLab (since 2026.11.14) the secret Quasar shows, starting with
whsec_, goes into GitLab's Signing token: GitLab then signs each delivery and the secret never travels. Only where that field is missing does it go into Secret token, which GitLab sends in clear with each delivery; never into both, since a secret sent in clear is also the signature's key.
- A gate that needs the host fails closed. When the host cannot be read, the move it would have checked is refused, never waved through; only a person can let it through for that outage (since 2026.11.7).
- What Quasar cannot prevent, it flags. A push to a protected line can be refused only by the host. Quasar records every move of those lines it observes, judges it against the promotions a person authorized, and flags the rest to the project's leads. On Bitbucket Cloud (since 2026.11.7), GitHub (since 2026.11.11) and GitLab (since 2026.11.14), where its credential may read them, it suggests the host's missing branch restrictions.
- Its own load on the host is counted, per host, and a service level warns the operators when calls keep failing.